FUJITSU White Paper: Cyber Threat Lab by Marnerides, Angelos et al.
White paper Cyber Threat Laboratory  






Cyber Threat Laboratory 
Angelos K. Marnerides1, Daniel Prince1, John Couzins2, Ryan Mills1, Vasileios Giotsas1, Paul McEvatt3, David Markham3, Catherine Irvine3    
1Security Lancaster, School of Computing & Communications, Lancaster University, UK 
2Information System Services, Lancaster University, UK 





With the growth of the Internet and billions of connected devices, opportunities are greater than ever for 
sophisticated and targeted attacks. Gaining an understanding of how attackers operate is crucial in the 
prevention of further compromise and exploitation. The Cyber Threat Laboratory is an environment built in 
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Introduction 
Recent trends within the cyber security spectrum indicate an increasing 
number of threats which employ complex exploits capable of delivering 
harm to systems on a wide scale. These attacks are non-trivial in nature 
and aim to siphon proprietary information for monetary or geopolitical 
gain. It is essential for organisations to have measures in place which 
protect critical assets or risk financial and reputational damage. 
 
An intimate understanding of how sophisticated attacks operate play an 
instrumental role in combatting this evolving threat landscape, and by 
monitoring the communication patterns used by malicious sources this 
can be achieved. Attracting certain attack campaigns by masquerading 
as weakly protected services has recently proven fruitful in gaining this 
data. The Cyber Threat Laboratory enables the collection of these 
sources of intelligence, allowing rapid attribution of attack campaigns 
using diverse data sources.  
 
Cyber Threat Laboratory Overview 
Fujitsu Enterprise & Cyber Security and Lancaster University have 
partnered to create a flexible research facility that enables threat 
analysis and identification of sophisticated attacks to be tested. The 
Cyber Threat Laboratory hosted at Lancaster University is designed to 
provide a collaborative platform that allows analysis of threats and 
behaviour to take place, in a safe and controlled environment. The 
laboratory provides centralised infrastructure enabling multiple projects 
and experiments operating simultaneously inside the lab to benefit from 
mature industry standard tools. 
 
Comparable to any research with unknown volatile outcomes, 
experiments into cyber threats and malware also needs to be handled in 
a controlled environment with appropriate safeguards and equipment. 
Lancaster University with industry input from Fujitsu is now able to offer 
this to its users though the Cyber Threat Laboratory.  
 
The laboratory consists of multiple inter-connected components which 
provide a framework for projects to analyse vast amounts of malicious 
data garnered by myriad sources. This data proves fruitful in 
understanding the manner in which attackers operate and will ultimately 
be used in the prevention of such attacks. The method in which the data 
is retrieved and how this is dissected is dependent upon each 
experiment’s procedure. This allows a wide range of possible techniques 
which benefit from a shared infrastructure that promotes collaboration. 
 
Various experiments have been conducted in the Cyber Threat 
Laboratory and many more have been offered as part of academic 
research such as undergraduate, postgraduate and doctoral thesis 
proposals. Not only does this foster interest in the security field for 
young students, but it also benefits the laboratory as a whole by 
contributing additional data to consider. Active experiments inside the 
Cyber Threat Laboratory employ various means of capturing raw data 
relating to campaigns spearheaded by malicious actors. Currently the 
laboratory hosts honeypots with varying levels of interaction which 
masquerade as legitimate services exposed to the Internet using 
Lancaster University‘s IP space assigned to the lab. These honeypots are 
provisioned to collect data from all sources attempting communication, 
therefore, analysis of this data must be undertaken in order to uncover 
knowledge of any intrusions and reconnaissance attempted. 
Experimentation 
In an attempt to promote collaboration and further analysis of results, 
each experiment has access to a shared infrastructure which hosts a 
range of valuable services. Furthermore, the shared infrastructure is 
capable of hosting large amounts of data and is primarily used for storing 
the logs gathered by each experiment, thus reducing the hardware 
requirements of each. Granting this open access to projects also enables 
another powerful aspect: the correlation of data from a wide array of 
sources. This further highlight instances of malicious activity, thus aiding 
the production of countermeasures using multiple technologies 
conducted by a diverse set of research members. 
 
The technologies used to assess certain attack scenarios differ 
depending upon circumstance, however, facilitating the transfer and 
visualisation of logs via embedded protocols enables each experiment to 
rapidly analyse rich data sets in a secure environment. The widely 
acclaimed Elastic Stack was used for this purpose, and currently has a 
growing number of events shipped from the experiment sensors. Each 
experiment located within the Cyber Threat Laboratory captures 
different data as the sensors are located in separate IP space and are 
configured based upon the researcher’s goals. Due to this, the Elastic 
Stack records data in collections based upon the sensor type, ensuring 
the encapsulation of data. Laboratory members are also granted access 
to each collection enabling correlation across data sets. 
 
The sensors, once exposed to the Internet through the networks offered 
by the Cyber Threat Laboratory, are implemented in different manners 
and have the ability to masquerade as any legitimate service. Currently 
active implementations within the lab include sensors acting as popular 
SSH and Telnet services, tempting malicious actors with the chance to 
infiltrate University infrastructure. By ensuring these services have weak 
authentication credentials, the laboratory has captured multiple 
successful login requests which allow an attacker the ability to further 
compromise the network. Once authentication is successful an emulated 
shell session is delivered to the attacker which records all activity within 
the machine. This is especially useful in the creation of countermeasures 
for sophisticated attacks as details about the entire attack process are 
uncovered. While recording reconnaissance activity is useful in 
attribution of certain conventional (e.g., Mariposa) but also IoT-based 
large-scale botnets (e.g., Mirai-alike), system level activity administered 
by malicious actors grants further understanding about how exploits are 
leveraged to gain increased foothold into infrastructure as well as the 
type of malware employed by certain campaigns. 
 
In parallel, the virtualization of various experimental testbeds residing 
within Lancaster’s Security Institute is an on-going activity to enable the 
composition of enriched and dynamic IoT honeypots. Through this 
activity the development of macroscopic tracking and early detection of 
large-scale IoT-based botnets is currently in progress. Hence, the 
Macroscopic Analysis of IoT-based Intrusions (MATI) project has recently 
started with some interesting initial findings in the context of detecting 
industrial control systems that are infected with Mirai-alike malware. By 
correlating data gathered at the Cyber Threat Laboratory with external 
sources of information (e.g., BGP, Censys scans) we can now identify 
networks in which devices that manage energy or water utilities are 
already infected and are members of a greater Mirai-like botnet army.  
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Architecture 
The laboratory is divided into two primary logical zones, a green zone 
that allows management and entry into the environment and a red zone 
which hosts the machines and devices where analysis of threats takes 
place.  
 
The laboratory provides controlled experiments of varying risk levels to 
take place through a number of segmented networks. These networks 
employ differing access to local and internet services and are further 
described below. 
 
Laboratory Public Networks 
Public networks are designed to emulate servers and devices that are 
directly publicly accessible over the internet. This allows analysis of 
scanning and attacks that are typically seen across webservers and 
networks.   
 
Laboratory NAT Networks 
These networks are designed to emulate personal, enterprise or 
organisation networks. Internal hosts are all permitted outbound access 
through a shared public address.   
 
Shared Infrastructure 
Hosts on the shared infrastructure network allow other networks 
located in other red zone networks to utilise central infrastructure such 
as logging, authentication, name resolution, etc. This reduces the 
complexity required when setting up experiments and allows 




These networks are used to monitor activity that do not require any 
external connectivity outside of the lab or have a significant risk of 
negatively impacting external sources outside of the university. This is 
especially useful for the analysis of malware garnered from monitoring 




University IP space can often be subject to specialised attacks that 
provide researchers with a broad range of data. Traffic from most 
business networks will consist of similar predictable flows, such as 
connections to online CRM systems, online storage and some personal 
employee traffic. University networks contain a very broad spread of 
activity, from large amounts of research traffic from CERN to shops and 
residential activity.   
 
Academic networks have been at the centre of a number of large attacks 
over the last five years that have forced Higher Education providers and 













 The combination of industry standard technologies and novel 
architecture design provides users of the lab imperative benefits 
such as: 
 
n Central placement and overview of all cyber research 
n Centralised, mature monitoring 
n Considered and tested safeguards 
n Real world traffic 
 
Designed with flexibility and security in mind, the Cyber Threat Lab 
incorporates best practices to encapsulate various experiments 
within their corresponding network space, whilst allowing access to 
shared infrastructure components.  
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Safeguards 
As the network operates inside the university network there is a number 
of technical and procedural controls that have been implemented to 
reduce the associated risks. Traffic traversesing the external network 
from the zones inside the lab is monitored and controlled by the 
Information Systems Services Team and the Security Lancaster Institute.  
 
Projects are also subject to peer review, risk assessment and require 
additional sign off to ensure the experiments are appropriate and are 
placed into the correct locations of the network. 
 
Future work  
The Cyber Threat Laboratory is dependent upon research members 
conducting innovative experiments to gather novel data relating to 
emerging threat actors. This data is intrinsic in the creation of 
countermeasures which provide a safeguard against sophisticated 
attacks that would otherwise wreak havoc among enterprise systems. 
This perpetual back and forth battle between malware authors and 
defense architects means that efforts in prevention have to be constant 
and rigorous, considering all available data. Due to this, it would be 
greatly beneficial to collaborate with other similar systems to share and 
correlate between data sets to find previously unseen trends and 
patterns. Furthermore, the experiments taking place within the Cyber 
Threat Laboratory must evolve to acknowledge the most recent and 
impactful threats. Therefore, the Cyber Threat Laboratory will act as the 
facilitator for a range of cyber threat intelligence frameworks that can 
adjust over particular stakeholder scenarios. Hence, a diversity of threat 
scenarios exists within a range of deployments ranging from the IoT up 
to industrial control systems, critical infrastructures and smart energy 
systems. 
 
An on-going developing approach in the prevention of crippling attacks 
on electronic systems is the notion of Active Defence. This technique 
crucially places sensors within an enterprise network which typically 
have no purpose other than alerting when they have been interacted 
with. This interaction suggests that there exists a possible intrusion 
taking place, and procedures can therefore be put in place, based upon 
knowledge derived from monitoring, in an attempt to neutralize the 
threat. The Cyber Threat Laboratory is an ideal candidate for the 
implementation of such system as it provides a wealth of information 
garnered from sensors scattered amongst the network. 
 
As the Cyber Threat Laboratory reaches maturity, the technologies 
embedded within may be deemed ineffective in the monitoring and 
analysis of the most recent threats encountered. As the threats evolve, 
so must the way in which they are examined. To combat the most 
sophisticated attacks which are targeted are highly coordinated in 
nature, this evolution must also consider the architecture of the 
network. These threats which incorporate lateral movement between 
internal services to gain further foothold into infrastructure must have a 
realistic network topology to encourage malicious actors to utilize 
exploits and infiltrate multiple times. Due to this, multiple services which 
are physically located within the same network segment should be 
deployed and emulate a realistic enterprise network.  
 
Conclusion 
This white paper presents the design of the Cyber Threat Laboratory and 
provides information relating to the experiments which reside therein. 
The Cyber Threat Laboratory has indexed a vast amount of data 
emanating from malicious sources and through the efforts of its 
researchers, there has been substantial progress in the identification of 
threats which target valuable infrastructure. Through the Cyber Threat 
Laboratory it was feasible to setup long-term research trajectories in the 
context of cyber threat intelligence, early detection and attribution of 
APTs as well as tracking of large-scale IoT-based botnets. Apart from the 
composition of dynamic honeypots for The Cyber Threat Laboratory 
monitoring and measurement infrastructure has managed to facilitate 
the composition of the MATI project, the first project to correlate diverse 
sets of datasets such as to monitor and identify “on the fly” infected 
industrial control system devices on a global scale.  
 
In general, the instrumentation and technical objectives within the 
Cyber Threat Laboratory already indicate pioneering research paths and 
continued synergy of UK enterprise and academia. As such, it can 
adequately meet the needs of the UK enterprise sector as well as to 
establish the UK in general as a world-leader in cyber threat intelligence.  
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